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RECENT CASES
TRUST-CHARITABLENESS OF A TRUST WHICH ATTEMPTS TO
INFLUENCE LEGISLATION

A bequest was made to the Board of Temperance, Prohibition and Public
Morals of the Methodist Episcopal Church, which was incorporated in the District of Columbia under the statute dealing with benevolent, charitable, educational, religious or missionary societies (D.C. Code 1929, T. 5, Sect. 121 et
seq.), to promote the cause of temperance and to prohibit the use of drugs and
narcotics, part of its activity being the attempt to influence legislation. The bequest was made in 1933 and was deducted from the estate tax on the testatrix's
estate under the Revenue Act of 1926, C.

27,

44 Stat. 9, Sect. 303 (a) (3), 26

U.S.C.A. Int. Rev. Acts, p. 234, which authorizes the deduction from the value
of the gross estate of the amount of all bequests . . . to . . . any corporation
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary or
educational purposes. . . . The Board of Tax Appeals disallowed the deduction.
Held, the trust was charitable and the bequest was deductable under the Revenue
Act of 1926 . The dissenting judge considered the trust to be noncharitable, thus

disallowing the deduction. Girard Trust Company et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 122 Fed. (2d) 108 (1941).

The validity of a charitable trust whose primary purpose is one of a religious nature is not questioned by the majority opinion nor by the dissenting opinion but is accepted as such under the general rule of law. Jones v. Renshaw, 130
Pa. 327, 18 A. 651 (1889); Rest. of Trusts, Sect. 371. The entire court agrees
and follows the weight of authority that a gift to prohibit, or minimize, the
manufacture, sale or use of intoxicating liquors will be good as a valid charitable
trust. Haines v. Allen, 78 Ind. 100, 41 Am. Rep. 555 (1887); Buell v. Gard-

ner, 83 Misc. 513, 144 N.Y.S. 945 (1914); Rest. of Trusts, Sect. 374, Com. b;
Scott on Trusts, Vol. 3, p. 2001, Sect. 374. The conflict in the opinion of the
members of the court arises over the fact that part of the activities of the Board of
Temperance were to influence legislation, and its -effect on the charitableness of
the trust.
It has been well said in People v. Dashaway Ass., 84 Cal. 114, 12 L.R.A.
117 (1890), that:
"The enforcement of charitable uses cannot be limited to any narrow and stated formula

. . .

It must expand with the advancement

of civilization and the daily increasing needs of men".
In this expansion the majority of courts have held that a trust whose purpose is to promote or change legislation may be a charitable trust, 21 A.L.R.
951; and the notion that a trust for a purpose otherwise charitable is not charitable if the accomplishment of its purpose involves a change in existing laws has
been rather thoroughly rejected. Scott on Trusts, Vol. 3, p. 2006, Sect. 374,
(4); Taylor v. Hoag, 273 Pa. 194, 21 A.L.R. 946 (1922); George v. Braddock, 45 N.J.Eq. 757, 18 A. 881 (1889); Garrison v. Little, 75 Ill. App. 402,
(1898); Rest. of Trusts, Sect. 374, Com. j. To hold a trust noncharitable because its purpose is to be accomplished by a change in the law would be ir-
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peaching progress and discouraging our democratic form of government.
The dissenting judge favors the English and Massachusetts view, that a
trust whose purpose is to change or promote legislation cannot be charitable. 4
Haisbury's Laws of England, 2nd Ed., Charities, p. 137; Jackson v. Phillips, 96
Mass. 539 (1867). If this view were to be followed to its logical conclusion,
legislative reform would be seriously hampered and legitimate efforts toward
efficiency in government would be discouraged.
Thus it is generally accepted that a trust whose primary motive is charitable
in nature but the accomplishment of which involves the change or promotion of
legislation is treated as a charitable trust. The importance of the principle and
the effect it would have if decided otherwise is best stated by Mr. Justice Frazer
in Taylor v. Hoag, supra:
"To hold that an endeavor to procure by proper means a change in
the, law is in effect, to attempt to violate that law, would discourage improvement in legislation and tend to compel us to indefinitely live under our laws designated to an entirely different state
of society".
W. W. H.

TORTS-NEGLIGENCE--GRATUITOUS LICENSEE-CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE

Plaintiff's intestate, a minor 16 years old, was electrocuted about 4 o'clock
Sunday afternoon by coming in contact with a high voltage, uninsulat~d wire
which had been carried down by a dead tree, falling across the path along which
he and an older sister were walking. The wires were in the possession of, and
controlled by, the defendants and were strung on poles 8 to 12 feet high, located in the middle of an abandoned tramway. The path taken by the decedent,
generally used by the public, ran from a public road near a coal mine entrance,
thence along the tramway beneath the power line to other paths and to the location of the plaintiff's home. The boy stepped over the fallen tree onto the wire
and was immediately electrocuted. In an action of trespass by the deceased's
father to recover damages for death of son, judgment was given for the plaintiff
for $1500, d&fendant appealing. Held, for reason of the facts that there was
(1) a permissive use of the pathway; (2) negligence of defendant in failing to
insulate the electric wires; (3) constructive notice to defendant that wires were
down, and (4) no contributory negligence on the part of the boy, the judgment
of the lower court was affirmed. Markovich v. Jefferson Coal & Coke Corporation,

-

Pa. Super. -,

22 A. (2d) 65 (1941).

The Superior Court has not yet come to the point where it will stop calling
"a spade a heart" instead of "a spade" in order to gain an end. For many years
it has been thL practice of the majority of the courts of the land to attach to the
various parties labels, such as is found in this case under the label ",gratuitous
licensee' when such is not at all necessary. Mere words will not help in solving
the case at bar. Under the facts as found, the Superior Court determined that
the Markovich youth was not a trespasser. Admitting that, at one time, he possibly could have been a trespasser, the court cited Hogan v. Etna Concrete Block
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Co., 325 Pa. 49, 188 A. 763, in which Mr. Justice Drew stated: "Toleration of
trespass for sufficient time gives rise to privilege which adds to the duties of the
occupier in the maintenance and use of his premises." Assuming the toleration
of the would-be trespasser, the court in order to remove the chance-block to recovery, by reason of the possible trespass, placed upon the deceased the name
"gratuitous licensee", as distinguished from "trespasser", for the purpose of increasing the duty of the defendant toward the deceased. This naming of one a
"gratuitous licensee", "permittee" or the like still does not answer the question,
which is not solely a matter of law but one to be decided by the jury. It is
merely self-justification by the court by use of a mere name. The Superior Court,
however, is not the only court in this state guilty of such a misconception of the
value of mere words. See, for example, O'Leary v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Ry.
Co., 248 Pa. 4, 93 A. 771; Rahe v. Fidelity-PhiladelphiaTrust Co., 318 Pa. 376
(involving the Pennsylvania playground rule), and Cortanza v. Pittsburgh Coal
Co., 276 Pa. 90, 119 A. 891.
Looking at this matter in a different vein, to make one a "licensee" upon
the premises or property of another it must be shown that he is there by permission or authority of the owner, or his authorized agent. The permission and
authority amounting to a license must be expressly or impliedly granted, and a
mere sufferance or failure to object to one's presence upon another's premises is
insufficient within itself to constitute a license, unless under such circumstances
that permission should be inferred. "Gratuitous" taken alone merely means without valuable or legal consideration. Taking the two words "gratuitous licensee"
together, the question remains whether such is a proper description for the deceased party. The answer is a matter of conjecture, hardly free from argument.
Would it not have been better to merely have the jury decide whether or not the
party had been a trespasser? If so, one result would follow; if not, another result would arise due to the increased duty of the owner of the property. The
use of such misleading labels tends to confuse rather than elucidate the positions
of the respective parties to the suit.
There is a well-settled rule in Pennsylvania that one using a dangerous
agency or instrumentality is bound to exercise care commensurate with the danger. One maintaining a high voltage electric wire is required to exercise the
highest degree of care practicable. This rule was announced first in the case of
Fitzgerald v. Edison Electric Co., 200 Pa. 540, 50 A. 161, and numerous decisions have sustained this view. See: MacDougall v. Pennsylvania Power and
Light Co., 311 Pa. 387, 166 A. 589; Sebok v. Pennsylvania Edison Co., 331 Pa.
524, 1 A. (2d) 680; Shapio v. Philadelphia Electric Company, ~ Pa. Super. -,
21 A.(2d) 26. The rule, however, is definitely vague as to the standards actually required, and thus it is for the jury to determine from the circumstances of
each case whether the degree of care exercised by the defendant frees him from
the charge of negligence toward the plaintiff. The court, however, involved itself in the vagarities of constructive notice of the defect by the defendant. Why
the issue of constructive notice should be necessary to the decision is not apparent as the defect complained of, viz., the lack of insulation, was one of original
construction and not one arising from wear, in which case proof of notice, actual
or constructive, is not required. Yaeger v. Edison Electric Co., 246 Pa. 434, 92
A. 500. The court, however, enunciated the rule that the length of time necessary to constitute constructive notice of a dangerous condition depends upon the
circumstances of each case, including the place where the dangerous condition
exists, the population of the neighborhood, the possibility of injury to persons in
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the vicinity, etc. Fedorawicz v. Citizens Electric Ilium. Co., 246 Pa. 141, 92 A.
124, approved in Grossheim v. Pittsburgh & Allegheny Telephone Co., 255 Pa.
382, 100 A. 126. It would have been sufficient for recovery if the jury had
found that defendant did not exercise the requisite degree of care in erecting and
maintaining uninsulated wires on short poles in such close proximity to a permissive path that a falling tree might dislodge them and cause injury to a person
lawfully using the path. Schrull v. Philadelphia Suburban Gas & Electric Co.,
279 Pa. 473, 124 A. 141. This is what the jury found and the discussion of
constructive notice, important where the question of non-use of the highest degree of care in the first instance is not too obvious, became in this case mere
surplusage.
The decision of this case, however, apart from the court's reasoning process,
illustrates tht constant trend in Pennsylvania cases where uninsulated wires of
high voltage are involved, to allow recovery for injuries therefrom so long as
negligence is found by the jury to exist. Ashby v. PhiladelphiaElectric Co., 328
Pa. 474, 195 A. 887; Daltry v. Media Electric Light, Heat & Power Co., 208
Pa. 403, 57 A. 833.
W. D. B.

ADVERSE POSSESSION-TACKING---LAND

NOT DESCRIBED IN DEED

Plaintiff and defendant are the owners of adjoining lots. Buildings on defendant's lot encroach upon a strip of plaintiff's lot 91/ feet wide and 45 feet
long. The buildings have been so situated since 1903, but defendant has been
in possession only since 1925, nor has any prior occupant of defendant's buildings been in possession for the full prescriptive period of 21 years. The deeds
by which the land had been conveyed from time to time since 1903 did not, in
their descriptions, include the strip of plaintiff's land occupied by the buildings,
but merely described the lot as surveyed. Held, the defendant could not tack
the possession of his predecessors to his own in order to gain title to the strip by
adverse possession. Masters et al. v. Local Union No. 472, United Mine Workers of America, - Pa. Super -, 22 A.(2d) 70 (1941).
The court cited only two cases in support of its decision, Schrack v. Zubler,
34 Pa. 38 and 46 Pa. 67, and Shaffer v. Lauria, 50 Pa. Super. 135.
All cases of tacking turn upon the question of whether there is privity between the successive adverse possessors. In the case of Sebrack v. Zubler, supra,
tht court held that there was no privity because the one who had conveyed the
property was not the adverse possessor at all, but one who had wrongfully assumed the duties of executor of the adverse possessor's estate. In Shaffer v.
Lauria, supra, the case was appealed on predetermined facts to decide whether a
land owner had a fee in a strip of his neighbor's land by reason of the fact that
he and his predecessors in title had exercised a right of way over the neighbor's
land for a combined period of 21 years. The court held that the adverse claimant did not have a fee, but intimated (at page 141 of the report) that he would
have had an adverse title to the easement, even though tht deeds by which the
property had come to the present owner did not purport to convey it. Thus
these two cases in no way passed upon the question of tacking as presented in
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the principal case.
There is authority in Pennsylvania contrary to this case. In Scheetz v. Fitzwater, 5 Pa. 126, Chief Justice Gibson said, "A proprietor who occupies his
neighbor's land as a part of his farm may certainly transfer his possession of the
whole by a conveyance of the farm." See also the case of Thompson v. Kauf elt,
110 Pa. 209. There A and B owned adjoinin, lots. A's land was to extend up
to the line given in B's deed. However, B built a house which extended beyond
the line given in his deed, so as to encroach upon A's land. B's title was transferred to C and the court held that C might tack his possession of the strip of
A's land to the possession of B. In Couke v. DalI, 19 D. & C. 655, there was a
conveyance of land enclosed by a fence by the adverse possessor thereof, and the
description in the conveyance did not include the whole of the enclosed land. It
was held to be a conveyance of the whole. In Stark v. Lardin, 133 Pa. Super. 96,
the adverse possessor conveyed by deed to his son, who immediately went into
possession of all the land his father had occupied. Although the deed was intended to transfer the disputed strip, the description did not include it. The
court held that tht son could tack his father's possession to his own. There was
sufficient privity.

"...

the actual delivery of the possession of the disputed

land to William R. Stark (the son) and wife was coincident with the deed of
1928 and this has been frequently held in other jurisdictions sufficient to establish privity. Maremont v. Ovenv, 329 Ill. 374, 160 N.E. 572; Duck Island H.
and F. Club v. Whitnak, 306 Il1. 284, 137 N.E. 840. It has been specifically
held in other jurisdictions that the attribute of privity will not be lost between
the grantor and the grantee when there is a defective description of the parcel if
there has been an actual transfer of the disputed parcel. McAnally v. Texas Co.,
124 Tex. 196, 76 S.W.(2d) 997; Brumbaugh v. Gompers, 269 Fed. 472; Smith
v. Chapin, 31 Conn. 530; Vandall v. St. Martin, 42 Minn. 163, 44 N.W. 535;
Vance v. Wood, 22 Ore. 77, 29 Pac. 73; Kepley v. Scully, 185 Il. 52, 57 N.E.
187. The theory of the cases is that there is privity where there is an actual
transfer of possession with intent to pass title.' In support of these cases, see
also Helmic3 v. Davenport, R. ., and N. W. R. Co., 174 Iowa 558, 59 N.E.
1028, 86 Am. St. Rep. 486; Crowder v. Neal, 100 Miss. 730, 57 So. 1; West v.
Edwards, 41 Ore. 609, 69 Pac. 992.

"Consequently, in spite of the decisions that, if the land in dispute is not
included in the description in a particular conveyance, the possessions of the
grantor and grantee cannot be tacked, it seems that even in such a case the possessions can be tacked if there was an oral transfer of the possession by the former to the latter, in addition to the making of the written conveyance." IV
TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, (Third Ed.), p. 436.
In 1 R.C.L. 719, sec. 33, it is said, "Thus where the owner of a tract of
land occupied other property, adjacent thereto, by adverse possession, it is not
material that in selling the whole, the land claimed by adverse possession is not
described in the conveyance." See, St. Louis, Southwestern R. Co. v. Mulkey, 100
Ark. 71, 139 S.W. 643; Clithero v. Fenver, 122 Wis. 356, 99 N.W. 1027, 106
A.S.R. 978; Wishart v. McKnight, 178 Mass. 356, 59 N.E. 1028, 86 A.S.R.
486; Morgan v. Jensen, 47 N.D. 137, 181 N.W. 89.
In Corpus Juris, Vol. 2, pp. 91-92, secs. 96-97, it is said: "The general rule
is that possessions cannot be tacked to make out title by prescription where the
deed under which the last occupant claims title does not include the land in dis-
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pute. However, the mere fact that the land in dispute was not included in the
deed will not of itself operate to deprive the grantee's possession of the land of
the attribute of privity. . . . So it has been held that independently of any
question of mistake, successive grantors may transfer their possession of a strip
of land successively and continuously occupied as a part of the granted premises,
but not included in the description of any of the deeds, and that by such continuity of possession for the prescriptive period title by limitations may be acquired." See, Jardon v. Riley, 178 Mass. 524, 60 N.E. 7; WisLart v. McKnight,
supra, Naher v. Farmer, 60 Wash. 600, 111 Pac. 768; Humes v. Bernstein, 72
Ala. 546; Il. Cent. R. Co. v. Hatter, 207 Il. 88, 69 N.E. 751.

In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 2, pp. 696-697, sec. 131 (d), it is said
that "As a general proposition, a claimant may not tack to his claim arising from
his possession of a disputed strip of land the possession of his grantor where the
disputed land was not mentioned or described in a deed or conveyance to him of
other land. .

.

. Yet, where the prior adverse possessor has continuously occu-

pied a building which encroaches on an adjoining lot, a deed conveying the lot
actually owned by him, shown by the evidence to have been intended to transfer
the building as a whole, and followed by the grantee's possession of the whole
building, will give rise to a privity between the grantor and the grantee as to the
disputed strip which will permit a tacking." Belotti v. Bickhardt, 228 N.Y. 296,
127 N.E. 239.

"In several cases it has been held that where land adversely held is included
in the same inclosure with land owned and conveyed by the grantor, the taking
possession by the grantee of the entire inclosed area creates a privity with tht
grantor as to the portion not conveyed." 1 Am. Jur. 883; St. Louis, Southwestern R. Co. v. Mulkey, supra; Wishart v. McKnight, supra.

At 46 A.L.R. 797 it is stated that: "In several cases it has been held that
where land adversely held is included in the same inclosure with land owned
and conveyed by the grantor, the taking possession by the grantee of the entire
enclosed area creates a privity with the grantor as to the portion not conveyed",
citing, along with the other cases mentioned above, Rich v. Naffziger, 255 Ill.
98, 99 N.E. 341; Davock v. Nelson, 58 N.J.L. 21,, 32 A. 675; Bateman v.
Jackson, 45 S.W. 224; Gilman v. Brown, 115 Wis. 1, 91 N.W. 227.
In Duck Island Hunting and Fishing Club v. Whitnak, supra, the rule is

stated as follows: "Where a person having title by deed to a lot or tract of land
also has inclosed with it, and is in possession of, adjoining land, to which he has
no record title, and conveys the land by the description in the deed, and delivers
with it the possession of the whole enclosure, the continuity of possession will
not be broken, and the two possessions will be joined and considered one continuous possession."
It thus appears that this recent Pennsylvania cas-e unfortunately has departed
from this widely accepted theory of the principle of tacking which was, until this
time, a settled doctrine in the law of the commonwealth.
R. W. McW.
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OF INSURANCE

COMPANY TO

ACT UPON APPLICATION

Deceased applied for a twenty payment life insurance policy of $2,000,
with a double indemnity provision, on June 25, 1931, and paid $4 on the first
premium. Due to this application, the deceased did not take out a policy with
another company. The defendant, for no apparent reason, failed to either accept or reject the policy by August 25, 1931, the date on which the deceased
was accidentally killed. Deceased's administrator then sued in trespass to recover damages occasioned by the defendant's neglect to inform the deceased
within a reasonable time as to whether his policy was accepted or rejected. Held:
The neglect or unreasonable delay of an insurance company in acting upon an
application for insurance is not tortious, and a trespass action cannot be based
upon it because the law places no affirmative duty on an insurance company to
act upon an application for insurance within a reasonable time. Zayc, Admr., v.
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company of Boston, 338 Pa. 426, 13 A.
(2nd) 34 (1940).

The Supreme Court justifies the holding in the present case by assuming
that there was no legal duty placed upon the insurance company to act upon the
deceased's application for insurance within a reasonable time, and hence that a
failure to act could not be construed as negligence sufficient to make the insurance company liable for the deceased's losses in an action ex delicto. In establishing the lack of duty, the court refuses to inspect the equities which the facts
of the case present, and which are the primary bases for finding a duty in a
pioneering case such as this is in Pennsylvania. Instead they endeavor to show why
similar cases in other jurisdictions, oppositely decided, are wrong because they
based the duty owed by the insurance company on its franchise from the state,
Duffie v. Bankers Life Ass'n. Co., 160 Iowa 19, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913),

or

on the duty owed by a reasonably prudent business man acting under similar circumstances, Boyer v. State Farmers Mutual Hail Ins. Co., 86 Kan. 442, 121 Pac.

529 (1912). Further, though discussing a tort liability, the court makes the
following conclusion:
. . . the well established principle in the law of contracts that ordinarily a bare offer imposes no liability of any kind upon the person to whom it is made, unless and until it is accepted, necessarily
excludes the operation of the broad doctrine of negligence in situations where it might possibly apply but for this principle."
In a suit begun purely on a tort basis, the law of contracts should not be allowed
to preclude the possibility of negligence, and a duty should be placed upon the
defendant if the facts indicate the risk of its action damaging someone far exceeded the utility of its conduct.
In the Restatement of Torts, sec. 298, comment "a", it is stated:
"As in all cases where the reasonable character of the actor's conduct is in question, its utility is a matter to be weighed against the
magnitude of the risk which it involves."
Had the court employed this test in their discussion of the existence of a duty,
rather than pursuing the course just outlined, they would have found that there
was no utility whatsoever in failing to pass on the deceased's application for insurance within a reasonable time. On the other hand, the risk of this delayed
action is apparent from the instant case. The deceased, although capable of pro-
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curing insurance elsewhere, refrained from so doing because of his arrangement
with the defendant, and thus died without the completed policy he had intended.
If the theory of the Restatement is correct, the result which it infers would be
plainly contrary to the present holding, and in accord with leading cases in other
jurisdictions. Stark v. Pioneer Casualty Co., - Cal. -, 34 Pac. (2nd) 731
(1934); Kukusha v. Home Mutual Hail-Tornado Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 166, 235
N.W. 403 (1931); Duffie v. Bankers Life Ass'n. Co., supra; Boyer v. Stale
Farmers Mutual Hail Ins. Co., supra.
It would seem that the court reached an erroneous result in the present case
because it neglected to consider the utility of the defendant's conduct in the light

of the risk it entailed, but instead assumed that no duty existed and attempted to
J. E. K.
justify this decision on contract rather than tort principles.
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"There ought to be a law" requiring all book reviewers to have paid the full
retail price of any book reviewed. One does not care to "look a gift horse in the
mouth." Even though the present reviewer will not retain the presently-discussed
volumes, his school library will receive the benefit thereof, and this may blun4
somewhat, the sharpness of his pen. But an honest review of this book requires
that some of its defects be pointed out specifically and a sense of appreciation has
not stilled our tongue entirely.
A mild criticism of the work of the author is his continuation in this second
edition of his policy enunciated in the first edition, as found in its preface: "LittlL
space has been used discussing doubtful propositions of law." The author must
purport to be (and indubitably is) an expert on the law of the conveying of real
property in Pennsylvania or he would not have the temerity to publish such a work.
Being an expert, his opinions on many matters where the cases are either in confusion or are silent or are not clear in their import, would have added much to the
utility of this work. Modesty should not be permitted to interfere with making
the treatise the most valuable one possible to judges, lawyers and students. We
feel that this practice has just that effect.
The book would have profited considerably by the careful touch of a skilled

